Canada-United States Law Journal
Volume 19

Issue

Article 34

January 1993

Discussion after the Speeches of E. Donald Elliott and John L.
Howard
Discussion

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj
Part of the Transnational Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Discussion, Discussion after the Speeches of E. Donald Elliott and John L. Howard, 19 Can.-U.S. L.J. 343
(1993)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol19/iss/34

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canada-United States Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Discussion After the Speeches of E. Donald Elliott
and John L. Howard
QUESTION, Professor King- I had a question for Don Elliott.
You have a separate set of rules under NAFTA regarding the environment. The GATT has Article 20 which allows regulations under more
stringent circumstances. Is this difference going to last or is it workable
for the North American countries to operate on this basis and have
another set of rules governing world trade?
ANSWER, Mr. Elliott: I think we are really just beginning in
that area. I do not think one can make too much of the language either. NAFTA would appear on its face to be more favorable to environmental regulation than GATT. Among other things, there are
strong provisions in NAFTA that place the burden of proof on the
party challenging environmental or other types of regulation. A lot depends on how substantial that burden of proof is ultimately interpreted
to be. Similarly, we do not have a lot of experience under the GATT
with challenges to environmental regulation and to the extent that
there have been challenges they have been decisions in the European
Community. I am thinking primarily about the Danish Bottles case.'
They have been very highly deferential to regulation. One of the key
questions has been if there is both a protectionist justification and a
plausible environmental justification should the measure be struck
down? Is there any sense of attempting to adjudicate? How much of
the motivation is for protectionists' purposes? Does a mere scintilla of
environmental justification suffice? So far the jurisprudence has said
yes. For example, as with the Danish Bottles case, which was concerned with the requirements for recycling measures in Europe, there is
a plausible environmental justification but there is also an awareness of
the trade benefits that has been sufficient to pass muster.
It remains to be seen whether or not the actual application of the
law by the expert panels under NAFTA will be a more searching and
probing review. I think a lot more depends on how the principles will
actually be applied than on the difference in language between the two.
QUESTION, Professor King: John, do you want to comment on
that?
ANSWER, Mr. Howard: Two things. I do not think there are
very many environmental havens left in the world. Most firms, when
they want to set up a plant, particularly if it is an environmentallysensitive plant (such as a Kraft pulp mill), are going to put in the best
available environmental technology. When you are building a new
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plant it is not a big issue. Virtually all of the serious problems happen
when you have an existing plant that is worth $800 million and is old.
It is something you are maintaining, but do not want to put three or
four hundred million dollars more environmental expenditure in without improving quality, quantity or productivity of that plant. That is
the difficult problem. I do not see all of this trading off in terms of
shopping around for an environmental haven. I do not think it is going
to happen very often.
On the more specific issue of the decisions by NAFTA, I am optimistic that the very structure of the NAFTA agreement is going to
force a contextual analysis by the panels and that they are going to
understand the political nature of the decision making concerning the
environment and various preferences that are made in different countries in connection with environmental problems. All over British Columbia we have gone crazy with an AOX standard. That is a general
organochlorine standard with respect to Kraft mills that should not be
confused with the dioxin, which is a specific biocumulative chlorine
compound everybody agreed was noxious, to say the least. Throughout
this continent Kraft mills substituted chlorine dioxide for elemental
chlorine. They are making progress and are close to eliminating the
dioxin problem. Nevertheless, without analysis, British Columbia has
gone to the level of a zero AOX standard that nobody else in this world
has even thought about. The EPA, I believe, is going to put out a report on this in 1995 after three years of very rigorous analysis. The
Swedish Institute has come out against an AOX standard. Even the
Federal Government of Canada has come out against a general AOX
standard.
What is the preference of the community? I would like to have
thought that in British Columbia they would do some analysis and, for
example, consider some of the air pollution problems that are of a
higher priority and have us put our 350 million dollars, or at least part
of it, into solving that problem instead of jumping into what was an
area of great topicality at the time because the Green Movement was
pressing it rather than doing what needs to be done.
COMMENT, Mr. Elliott: The legal standard under NAFTA is
very similar to the legal standard for judicial review under U.S. law. It
is a reasonable or necessary justification necessary under the GATT
and has been interpreted as being essentially the same as the due process standard of reasonable support.
The judicial standard in the U.S. has been actually applied in a
way that is highly deferential. I have done some empirical study of this
and between eighty and ninety percent of judicial review of agency decisions results in affirmance, and that is on all issues. You really have
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a situation in which judicial review is largely a rubber stamp.
The element of the NAFTA procedural design that holds out some
prospect of a somewhat more searching review is that these are not
reviews that are conducted by lay judges with general jurisdiction.
There is at least the possibility that these will be expert panels of people who have greater expertise in the field, perhaps even scientists. A
lot remains to be seen about the actual composition of the panels that
would be applying the standard. I think that is going to make a difference. The kind of scientific justification that will pass muster for a
judge who is not scientifically trained may be very different than the
type of justification that will suffice for someone who has a stronger
scientific background.
QUESTION, Professor King: I had a question in connection with
environmental regulation. Professor Elliott mentioned Superfund and
the extra costs that are involved in Superfund. Can the U.S. continue
to be far out in front of the rest of the world? Are we in danger of
pricing ourselves out of range against countries that do not enforce
their environmental regulations or do not have the statutes on the
book? Is there a concern about competitiveness?
ANSWER, Mr. Elliott: I spent a lot of time looking at the available information on competitiveness. If one looks at the environmental
issue in isolation it probably is the case that the U.S. is still rich
enough that we could continue to do a lot of not very sensible things
and still survive. It has, I think, a cumulative effect, and this is the
other side of what John Howard was saying that I agree with very
much. When you look at the studies, and this has been studied rather
thoroughly, the burden of environmental regulation in almost all industries is so small compared to other cost factors that it is very rarely
going to drive the location decision.
Environmental regulatory decisions typically are in the range of
about four percent of total cost factors. Environmental regulatory considerations are going to be dominated by proximity to raw materials,
transportation costs and labor costs. The environmental regulatory
costs cannot be large enough, even on something like Superfund, that
their aggregate effect on the economy is likely to cause someone to
locate in one country as opposed to another country. That has been
rather thoroughly studied in connection with the effect between the
United States and Mexico as a consequence with NAFTA.
Having said that, though, any additional cost affects some people
at the margins. That is the whole notion of marginalism. Some of the
hostile regulatory climate that we see in the environmental area is only
one element of a larger regulatory climate which I think is much less
facilitative on international competition in the U.S. political culture
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than in many of our competitors around the world.
I know more about Germany than I do about Japan, but certainly
when they define their environmental regulatory strategies in Germany,
they give a good deal more thought than we do to attempting to use
environmental regulation in a positive way, to facilitate international
competitiveness rather than to retard it. In the U.S., environmental
regulation, like other forms of regulation, at a minimum is not used in
a positive way, and often times the effects of environmental regulation
actually turn out to be perverse from the standpoint of international
competitiveness. Not because environmentalists, I think, are consciously motivated to be hostile to industrial development, but more
that the international competitiveness factors are simply not taken into
account as a part of the design of the regulatory system.
So, therefore, I believe that in the long run we do not have the
choice of not having an industrial policy. The types of social regulation
in the environmental area and other areas are so pervasive that they
are going to have a significant effect on industrial environment; therefore, the question becomes: To what degree are we going to take into
account policies other than protecting the environment in designing
those regulatory systems?
COMMENT, Professor King- It affects not only the existence of
the rules, but also the enforcement.
QUESTION, Mr. Barrett: For Professor Elliott. You gave some
specific ideas of cost and benefits in environmental regulation in the
U.S. How do you quantify the benefits of environmental regulations?
ANSWER, Mr. Elliott: It is very difficult to quantify the benefits.
Although, the benefits of environmental regulation are systematically
understated, there are certain benefits you can quantify. You can identify other benefits in addition to those that you are able to quantify, but
you are not in a position to quantify. There is a very large body of
theory that is developed about how you go about doing that. Most of it
has developed in the last ten or fifteen years under the regulatory impact analysis that we do under Executive Order 12291. Basically what
you attempt to do is to quantify the damage. For example, you should
attempt to sum up the health costs, the loss of employment, the additional deterioration of materials, and so on, that results as a result of,
say, air pollution. When you have got that all summed up, you recognize that you only captured a portion of the benefits that are actually
out there.
The danger, in terms of cost-benefit analysis, is what Larry Tribe
once called "the tyranny of false precision." If you think you have got
all the benefits, you are wrong. My view is that any environmental regulation that is in the same order of magnitude of cost and benefits is
probably a pretty good idea, because we systematically understated
what the benefits are. So, for example, the Clean Air Act of 1990 prob-
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ably has calculated benefits on the order of, say, twenty billion dollars
a year. The cost estimates are in the range of thirty to fifty billion
dollars a year. That does not bother me too much, because I think we
probably understated the benefits that we are able to quantify. On the
other hand, one regulation at the EPA had a calculated cost in excess
of sixty billion dollars and they were predicting that it would save three
lives over a hundred-year period. At that point, where you have that
kind of disconnect between the calculated benefits and the costs, in a
real gross order of magnitude sense, then I think one needs to begin to
ask some hard questions. Cost-benefit analysis is a very imprecise tool,
but it is very useful if it is used with sensitivity analysis, because it is
going to systematically understate the benefits because you can quantify costs much more easily than you can quantify benefits.
Having said that, I still think it is a usable technique because we
can essentially know the direction of the error and its approximate
magnitude.
QUESTION, Mr. Couzin: One thing that was not mentioned by
either speaker, which surprises me a bit, is the issue of taxes. A very
popular subject of conversation is becoming the use of tax instruments
in environmental policy for all different reasons.
It allows people to claim they are using market mechanisms for
trade determinants and things like that. It allows you to tax evil people
like those who keep their homes and drive cars and things. It allows
you at the same time to raise money. It has this dual benefit. Certainly
the province I live in is fine. It is very attractive. I wonder what you
think about the future use of tax instruments instead of regulatory instruments. I am specifically referring to things like carbon taxes and
permits for pollution.
ANSWER, Mr. Howard: We are into those in a big way, virtually
every place they are used. British Columbia is a classic example. There
are totally regressive property or -wealth taxes on existing operations. If
they had any relationship at all, either to the risk caused by the industrial facility or some threat to human health, I think we could all understand it.
Let me put it in perspective. In the City of Vancouver eighty percent of the pollution is imputable to automobiles, but eighty percent of
the air pollution tax is paid by the few industries left in the city. That
is how governments work.
What we are all optimistic about is coming up with some kind of
trading permits that will get it out of the political system altogether,
including out of the tax system. We have great difficulties in determining who is going to get what tradeable credits with respect to old mills,
new mills and so on, but the whole purpose of that policy is to try to
get it out of that regulatory system and into the marketplace.
ANSWER, Mr. Elliott: I am a great believer in market-based or
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incentives systems. However, I do not think they can completely replace command and control.
As a purely theoretical level, the most beautiful system is to set a
tax, as John indicated, based on the level of damage, and then the market allocates it as most efficiently how it can be done. The difficulty is
that people who talk about market failure often do not have a comparable theory of government failure. One of the difficulties that we have
found in terms of experience is, at least in our system, tax proposals
seem to be much more subject to rent seeking and political manipulation. The notion that assumes you can set a perfect tax based on the
damage function in some way assumes away the problem. One of the
reasons that, as a practical matter, we have gone in the U.S. increasingly to tradeable permit systems as opposed to tax systems is that our
experience is they are much less susceptible to the types of political
manipulation than are taxes.
In principle, I am quite favorable to the use of tax incentives as a
purely professorial theoretical matter. However, I think as a practical
matter, tax mechanisms tend to be much more subject to political distortion and manipulation at least in our system. That has caused them
to be less useful than they might have been.
QUESTION, Mr. Fay: President Clinton has said he wants to do
something about Mexico and redraft NAFTA. I got the impression
that he is still up in the air about where he stands and what Congress is
going to do. Do you have a crystal ball as to what can happen?
ANSWER, Mr. Elliott: As I have read his statements, he has very
carefully avoided saying he wanted to redraft NAFTA. In fact, what I
think he has said and what they appear to be doing is not attempting to
renegotiate the text of NAFTA, but to have a parallel process for the
implementation of NAFTA in which they are negotiating a series of
additional side agreements that will attempt, to some extent, to assuage
the concerns by some of the constituency groups. Then I think they will
declare NAFTA to have been fixed, at least to some degree, by these
side agreements. That is currently going on in terms of defining, for
example, the procedures to be followed by the North American Commission on Environment.
One of the great concerns that the environmental groups had is, as
originally drafted, NAFTA was silent as to whether or not they had a
seat at the table, whether or not they had a role, whether they could
participate, and what the composition of these groups would be. I suspect that what will happen is that there will be no renegotiation of the
basic text of NAFTA, but there will be a number'of things that are
being done and will continue to be done in sort of a parallel track of
how NAFTA is going to be implemented.
ANSWER, Mr. Howard: What I was going to do in a more formal presentation was try to suggest some of the things that I think
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should be done. This is derived from a very good article by Richard
Stewart in the current Washington and Lee Law Review. If there is
anything we need, it is some more particularization of not the standards but the factors that are to be considered when people are making
these decisions. NAFTA itself already puts the onus on the person
blocking trade to justify the environmental grounds for putting up the
block. In addition, you want to look at the entire context in which this
is done, the relative resources, the source of the resources, and the production and the dependence of the supplier on them. You want to look
at the trade relationships, you want to look very closely at the motives
of the people raising the block to try to determine what the adverse
impact is on trade, look for trade neutral ways to solve the problem
and, finally, again, consider whether. the remedy is totally disproportionate to the threat. This is another way of saying is it a trade blocking pretext or is it truly an environmental ground?
ANSWER, Mr. Elliott: I do not agree with all of that. The question really is how far are the environmental and labor groups going to
be able to move the Clinton Administration in getting assurances that
NAFTA will be interpreted in a "pro-environmental way" as a price
for getting the Clinton Administration's support for NAFTA. That is,
in fact, the process that is currently going on.
COMMENT, Professor King- I did want to indicate before we
close that the proceedings of our last conference which dealt with
environmental regulation are being used by some of the negotiators in
Mexico City who are meeting there now.

